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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN CONTRACTING ) 
CORPORATION, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Case 
No.10322 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a corporation franchise tax de-
ficiency assessment proposed against the Western Con-
tracting Corporation by the defendant for the year 1962, 
in the total amount of $32,913.59. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE STATE 
TAX COMMISSION 
A formal hearing was held before a lawfully con-
stituted quorum of the State Tax Commission on Sep-
tember 21, 1964, upon petition and notice as required by 
law. As a result of this hearing, the commission sus-
tained the aforementioned deficiency, thereby imposing 
liability for the tax upon the plaintiff. 
] 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the tax com 
mission and remand with directions as to the manner ancl 
basis of assessment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Western Contracting Corporation, the plaintiff, is an 
Iowa corporation duly qualified to transact business in 
the State of Utah. The plaintiff is engaged in the con-
struction business as a general contractor and engages 
in such projects as dredging rivers, building bridges and 
constructing airport facilities. In Utah plaintiff strips 
overburden or earth from the Kennecott Copper Com-
pany's Bingham Mine. 
During the year 1962 plaintiff performed general 
contracting ··work in eight different states. Severe losses 
resulted from some of the foreign state projects. Most 
of the losses resulted from dredging operations requir-
ing specialized equipme::i.t in order to perform the par-
ticular project involved_ 
Project revenues and costs relating to specific con-
tracts or projects closed in 1962 and the resulting net 
profit or loss are set forth in the following tables: 
CONTRACTS CLOSED DURING YEAR 
Project Revenue Direct Cost 
Union-Lincoln 
County ______________________ $9,014,197 .87 $7,295,903.22 
Kennecott Stripping-
Stage III __________________ 6,144,875.00 3,788,784.62 
2 
Lake St. Clair 
Dredging -------------- 3,07 4,773.52 1,654,262.52 
Erie Harbor Dredging 1,307,740.18 834,484.54 
Ashland Harbor 
Dredging ------------------ 768,814.60 616,513.66 
Stapleton Air Field ____ 3,529,804.85 3,376,262.23 
Delaware River 
Dredging ------------------ 1,976,958.50 2,170,581.54 
l\Iississippi Gulf 
Dredging ------------------ 1,573,000.00 3,006,491.34 
Hudson River 
Dredging ------------------ 1,418,994.50 1,739,547.38 
Floyd Ri\-er Bridges__ 440,520.51 401,882.39 
CONTRACTS CLOSED DURING YEAR 
Union-Lincoln 
Allocated 
Administrative 
Expenses Net Profit 
County ____________________ $1,285,123.7 4 $ 433,170.91 
Kennecott Stripping-
Stage III _______________ _ 
Lake St. Clair 
Dredging _______________ _ 
Erie Harbor 
Dredging _______________ _ 
Ashland Harbor 
Dredging _______________ _ 
Stapleton Air Field __ 
Delaware River 
Dredging ----------------
3 
614,608.24 1,741,237.43 
291,022.27 1,129,488.73 
146,605.20 326,650.44 
108,531.61 43,769.33 
593,860.47 ( 440,317 .85) 
381,611.15 ( 575,234.19) 
Mississippi Gulf 
Dredging ---------------- 528,653.98 (1,962,145.32) 
Hudson River 
Dredging ---------------- 305,901.60 ( 626,454.48) 
Floyd River Bridges 70,458.02 (31,819.90) 
If the net income from its Utah contract is excluded 
I 
plaintiff received $23,104,804.53 in total project revenue 
on jobs or projects closed in 1962. Total project costs 
and allocated administrative expenses on all projects 
closed in 1962, excluding the Kennecott project, were 
$24,806,696.86, resulting in an over-all net loss on proj-
ects closed in 1962 of $1, 702,892.33, if the Kennecott 
project is excluded. 
As reflected above, the gross project revenue or re-
ceipts to plaintiff from its Utah operations from con-
tracts completed in 1962 were $6,144,875.00. It was stip-
ulated that on a segregated accounting basis, after de-
ducting applicable expenses, that the net profit before 
federal taxes to be allocated to the Utah contract is the 
sum of $1, 7 41,237.43. 
Section 59-13-22, U.C.A. 1953, together with Section 
59-13-15, U.C.A. 1953, requires the filing of franchise tax 
returns on an accrual or percentage of completion basis. 
However, the nature of the accounting procedure used 
in connection with contracts of more than one year's 
duration, such as the taxpayer's Kennecott contract, ii 
such that the contract costs to be set off against contract 
receipts cannot be conveniently ascertained until coro-
pletion of the contract. Because of this fact, it is difficult 
4 
for plaintiff to file returns on a percentage of completion 
basis. 
In addition the plaintiff's records are maintained on 
a completed contract basis and its federal tax returns are 
prepared on such a basis. 
To alleviate the burden of annual payment on cor-
porations so maintaining their records, the tax commis-
~ion adopted a policy in 1944 requiring segregated ac-
counting for contractors. As part of this administra-
tive policy, income of all contractors was required to be 
computed and reported on a percentage of job completion 
or eomplete accrual basis. This requirement has been 
auhered to unless a contractor requests otherwise and 
agrees to file on a completed contract basis, using seg-
regated accounting. This policy was subsequently pro-
mnlgatecl as Corporation Franchise Tax Regulation No. 
8 by the commission (R. 87). 
In 1962 the plaintiff expressed its willingness to 
comply with the regulation of the commission and for-
mally agreed to report its income on a completed con-
tract and segregated accounting business basis (R.17-18). 
The plaintiff thereafter filed its Utah franchise tax 
return for 1962 using the segregated accounting method. 
It allocated a net income of $1,741,237.43 to Utah from 
its stripping contract with Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion. Plaintiff's total income before federal taxes for the 
year 1962 was $555,088.31. After deducting investment 
5 
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credit of $86,071.71 it paid federal income taxes in tlie 
a.mount of $183,215.11 resulting in a total net income tr
1 
plaintiff of $371,873.20 after federal taxes. 
For Utah franchise tax purposes, however, the plaiu 
tiff allocated the computed sum of $905,443.46 in fedmi 
taxes against the actual income from the Utah job. Thus, 
while it only paid $183,215.11 in actual federal taxes, it 
claims the right to deduct the federal taxes it would 01n 
if doing business in Utah alone after an income of 
$1, 7 41,237.43. 
The auditing division proposed an additional assess-
ment of $32,913.59 based primarily on the disallowanre 
of most of the f edera.l income taxes deducted on the 
return. 
The plaintiff now claims that its Utah income shonlcl 
be taxed pursuant to the allocation formula. set forth in 
Section 59-13-20, U.C.A. 1953, and not on a segregated 
accounting basis. It further contends that the commis-
sion's right to tax its segregated income is limited to its 
"net income" as defined by statute. It is also argueil 
that if the commission determines that segregated ac-
counting is proper, a projected federal income tax de-
duction must be allowed. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF'S UTAH INCOME IS SEP-
ARABLE FROM ITS FOREIGN INCOME AND 
MAY BE TAXED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY THIS 
STATE. 
The Utah franchise tax is a privilege tax on the 
right to do business in this state measured by net in-
come. Income derived from business done outside the 
state cannot be included in the tax. American Invest-
ment CnrJJ. v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 189, 120 
P. 2c1 ;331; J. M. & M. S. Browning Co. v. State Tax Com-
missiou, 107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2c1 993. In other words the 
-rnlne of the franchise for tax purposes is based on in-
rome attributable to business done ·within this state. Such 
fnrnehise or prfrilege is taxed at a rate of 4 per cent of 
the corporation's net income" allocated to this state ... " 
59-13-3, U.C.A. 1953 (emphasis suyiplied). 
The tax is imposed upon the portion of a multi-
state corporation's net income assignable or allocable to 
businesR done 'vithin this state. See 59-13-20, U.C.A. 
1953. This statute provides for an allocation formula 
designed to determine the portion of the taxpayer's busi-
ness taxable by this state. The section further provides: 
"(8) If in the judgment of the tax commission 
the application of the foregoing rules does not 
allocate to this state the proportion of net income 
fairly and equitably attributable to this state, it 
may with such information as it may be able to 
obtain make such allocation as is fairly calcula.ted 
to assign to this state the portion of net income 
7 
reasonably attributable to the business done 
within this state and to avoid subjecting the tax. 
payer to double taxation." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Thus the manifest intention of the Utah Legislature 
is to impose the franchise tax upon that portion of cor. 
porate net income attributable to business done within 
this state. 
It is clear that no state may tax any subject oi;er 
which it has no jurisdiction. However, it is equally 
well established that a state may tax that portion of a 
multi-state corporation's income which is derived from 
sources or activities within its boundaries. Shaff er v. Car-
ter, 252 U.S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 L. Ed. 445; United 
States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 
38 S. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135. 
No state may impose a tax which burdens interstate 
commerce. Gwen, White & Prince v. H enneford, 305 U.S. 
434, 59 S. Ct. 325, 83 L. Ed. 272. Double taxation may 
create an unfair burden on interstate commerce viola-
tive of the commerce clause. Adams Manufacturing Co. 
v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82 L.Ed. 1365 
·while the taxpayer herein does not claim constitu-
tional violations, these constitutional provisions explain 
the reason for Utah legislative insistence that only in-
come attributable to Utah business activities be taxeLl. 
The absence of some apportionment rule can lead to con-
stitutional objections. Therefore, where the source of 
income crosses state lines, some rule of apportionment 
8 
muRt be used by taxing authorities lest a tax on unap-
portioned multi-state income be declared invalid. Such 
a formula for apportionment is provided by 59-13-20(6), 
F.C.A. 195:3. 
In the present case the income sought to be taxed 
(loC's not cross state lines. It is entirely attributable to 
the tax payer's activities in Utah. 
"Such income, under the principles stated, could be 
segregated and taxed in its entirety by the state .... The 
same, it would follow, is true of income derived from 
personal services wholly performed within the state. It 
is only the income derived from a source which crosses 
state lines, such as business operations extending into 
more than one state, to which the rule of apportion-
ment must be applied." Allocation of Income in State 
Tarntio11, Altman & Keesling, C.C.H. 1946. See also In-
diaua Y. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 252, 61 
S. Ct. 866, 85 L. Ed. 1313. 
If the use of an otherwise permissible formula pro-
duces an obviously unreasonable result, and it is possible 
to sbow with fair accuracy by separate accounting the 
income attributable to a state, application of the formula 
is not required. Hans Rees Sons Inc. v. North Carolina, 
~83 U.S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 904. 
Even though the income of a business is derived 
partly from \Yithin and partly from without a taxing 
state. :m allocation to that state of a portion of the total 
income, as the basis for computing state income tax, 
is not ordinarily proper where the business transacted 
9 
within the state is separable from that transacted out-
side the state. The business within the taxing state lrn~ 
been held to be separable, so as to make an allocation 
improper, in a number of cases. See Annotation 130 
A.L.R. 1205. 
These cases include those of Piedmont & Am. R. Co. 
v. Query, 56 F. 2d 172, where a South Carolina corpora-
tion owned two entirely disconnected railroad lines, one 
in South Carolina and the other in North Carolina. The 
corporation paid income tax to South Carolina on the 
entire net income of the South Carolina line but paid no 
tax on the income of the North Carolina line. South 
Carolina taxing authorities attempted to use an appor-
tionment formula to reach income from the foreign line, 
and the federal court held for the railroad on the ground 
that income from the interstate business of the t'WO lines 
was readily separable and that the allocation statute was 
not intended to apply to such a situation. The court 
said: 
''We do not think that a proper construction of 
the statute requires that the formula be applied 
in such a case. The whole spirit of the act nega-
tives the intention to tax income earned beyond 
the limits of the state, which would result from 
applying the formula to a case such as this.'' 
The case of Fisher v. Standard Oil Co., 12 F. 2d 744, 
involved a foreign corporation doing business in North 
Dakota by selling petroleum products which it produced 
and refined wholly outside the state. There, also, North 
Dakota taxing authorities attempted to allocate the cor-
10 
poration 's business under a formula so as to reach out-
of-state business activity. The court there said: 
''The theories of allocation can have no place 
in the inquiry, if net income within the state 
stands on its own footing unmixed with outside 
business .... We think it cannot be doubted that 
the products as brought into this state had an 
easily ascertainable wholesale market price. We 
think appellee's business within the state is easily 
separable from its other business by charging it 
with the wholesale price of products which it sells 
in North Dakota. That would put it on an equal-
ity there with those who sell and do not produce 
and refine.'' 
Another similar case was that of Standard Oil Co. v. 
Tlrnresen, 29 F. 2d 708, which involved the same corpora-
tion but a later North Dakota statute which provided for 
the albeaiion to the state of such portion of the corpo-
ration's total income as its tangible property in busi-
ness bore to its total tangible property in business out-
~ide the state. The state thereupon contended that the 
corporation's business should be regarded as a unit in 
the production, refining, distribution and marketing of 
oil. But the court refused to accept the state's position. 
In the case of Starndard Oil Co. v. Wisconsin Tax 
Commission, 197 Wis. 630, 223 N.W. 85, a foreign corpo-
ration was engaged in the business of producing, refining, 
transporting, and marketing petroleum products. Its 
property in Wisconsin consisted largely of tanks in filling 
stations, and the corporation did no producing or refin-
ing in the state. The Wisconsin income tax statute pro-
11 
vided that ''persons engaged in business within and with-
out the state" should "be taxed only on such income ao 
is derived from business transacted and property located 
within the state," that "the amount of such income ap-
portionable to Wisconsin may be determined by an alli1-
ca tion and separate accounting thereof, when, in the judg-
ment of the tax commission, that method ·will reasonably 
reflect the income properly assignable to this state," but 
that otherwise such income should be determined hy 
allocating to vVisconsin a portion of the total income 
based upon a formula. The tax commission assessed the 
tax computed by the use of the allocation formula, lint 
the corporation contended that its income should be 
ascertained by the allocation and separate accounting 
method by which the ·Wisconsin business was charged at 
the market price with all products received by it. The 
court sustained the corporation's contention and said: 
''There are some operations which from their 
very nature produce an income which cannot he 
properly allocated by separate accounting meth-
ods, instances of which are the telegraph, tele-
phone, and express companies. They stand read~­
to serve whosoever may apply for service and the 
entire operation constitutes a unit of service. That 
is not the case with the manufacturing and sales 
business, particularly so \vhen the accounts ~re 
so kept as to he readily separable ... We perce11e 
no reason why under the facts of this case, the 
profits derived from the sales operations should 
not be ascertained insofar as plaintiff is concenwd 
as they would be if the sales operations were con-
ducted by a separate corporate entity." 
12 
l\Iost state tax statutes provided a method or formu-
la for allocating interstate income of a multi-state busi-
ness. Such allocation is appropriate only where the busi-
ness within the state is not separable. However, these 
statutes usually do not require the utilization of an allo-
eation formula where the statutory method would oper-
ate inequitably or fails to achieve its purpose under the 
('ircumstances. (For cases and statutes see 130 A.L.R. 
1207 --- 1'umota tiou State Income Tax on Business in 
Other States.) 
So, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. State Tax Com-
111ission, 145 Kan. 715, 68 P. 2d 1, a statute provided that 
in case allocation according to the statutory method was 
impractical or inequitable, so as to work an undue hard-
~hip upon the taxpayer, or in case the factors necessary 
for an allocation according to the statutory method could 
not be ascertained from the taxpayer's records, the tax-
11ayer should, subject to the approval of the tax com-
mission, allocate a fair part of its total income to the 
state by some other method. This case further held that 
the determination of whether or not the sratutory method 
of allocation should be used is ordinarily an administra-
tin~ cluty of the officers charged with the administration 
of the tax lavvs. A district court should not be allowed 
to substitute its judgment for that of the tax commission 
and make an independent determination of the proper 
method of allocation of income. 
rrlie case of Montgomery vVard & Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 151 Kan. 159, 98 P. 2d 143, involved a for-
13 
eign corporation operating over 500 retail stores, a part 
of which were located in Kansas. All merchandise sold 
in the Kansas stores were bought through the corpora. 
tion 's offices outside the state, and the business of the 
stores was administered and supervised through that 
office. A net income for the Kansas stores was arrired 
at by deducting from all their gross receipts expenses 
directly connected with the Kansas business and a pro-
rata share of the cost of purchasing, handling, and su-
pervisory activities carried on outside the state. The 
Kansas Tax Commission attempted to impose a tax 
on this entire "net income,'' but the corporation on its 
returns made an allocation of this income between Kan-
sas and the states in which the purchasing and super-
visory activities were carried on. 
The court pointed out that the taxpayer's Kansas 
income was segregated by direct accounting in that case, 
so that there was no question of allocation of its total 
income within and without the state, and both the statute 
providing a specific method of allocation and that pro-
viding for the use of some other method where the 
statutory method was impractical or inequitable were 
inapplicable. The court held the taxpayer entitled to a 
judicial review of the commission's refusal to permit an 
allocation of its Kansas income, where its method of ac-
counting was shown on its returns. 
The Utah case of Kennecott Copper Co. v. State 
Tax Commission, 18 Utah 140, 221 P. 2d 857, appears to 
be controlling. There the taxpayer engaged in certain 
14 
mining activities in the State of Utah. Mill concen-
trates were shipped outside the state for processing and 
tlic refined products sold outside the state by a wholly 
rnrnerl sulJsidiary of the taxpayer. 
A separate accounting system was maintained for 
the Utah Copper division, but the franchise tax for the 
>'ears prior to the controversy had been based on a spe-
eial allocation formula obtained by agreement between 
the parties. Kennecott thereafter attempted to change 
its reporting and determine the net income assignable 
to the state by pooling income from all of its divisons and 
then applyng- the formula prescribed by the statute. It 
asserted that it was an "indivisible" or unitary business. 
Sec 118 Utah, pp. 143, 147. The tax commission refused 
to allow the change. The court said: 
''\Ve see no good reason for reversing the 
State Tax Commission on this ruling and see 
many practical difficulties had a different method 
been permitted. In some instances the actual net 
income to be allocated to business transacted in 
this state cannot be fixed with certainty so the leg-
islature set up one method and then clothed the 
Commission with the power to permit selection of 
another method if it would more accurately reflect 
the true net income ... Kennecott's books are kept 
on the basis used bv the Commission in determin-
ing the deficiency a~d must of necessity be so kept 
... The franchise tax reports filed ... were based 
on the prescribed system aside from certain con-
tested items [and] they suggest a fair and equi-
table means of determining the tax liability .... 
To use the method [requested by the taxpayer] 
might introduce variable factors, some impossible 
to ascertainment .... In addition it might unjustly 
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discriminate against this state or the taxpayer 
in that the tax assessed might bear no reasonable 
relationship to ... the amount of business done in 
this state." 118 Utah, p. 149. 
The court concluded: 
"The problem that concerns us here is not that 
the Commission seeks to force the taxpayer to a 
non-statutory basis. On the contrary, the Com. 
mission has permitted the taxpayer to file on a 
basis selected by it which the taxpayer seeks to 
change because the amount of tax has become 
onerous. Such a request may be entirely legiti-
mate but when as here there are factors which 
cannot be determined with any degree of satis-
faction, the request is made some six years after 
the tax has accrued and the only reason assigned 
is that the change may substantially reduce the 
tax liability, the showing is not sufficient to con-
vince us that the Commission was arbitrary and 
capricious in denying the request.'' Ibid, p. 151. 
It appears therefore that resort to the formula estab-
lished by Section 59-13-20(6), U.C.A. 1953, is improper 
unless the income sought to be taxed by the State of 
Utah is attributable to two or more states. This is be-
cause a precise allocation of income may not be possible 
in such instances. 
Many types of income, however, can be specifically 
allocated or determined without resort to a formula. 111 
such cases the taxing state is justified in disregarding 
the formula and proceeding to tax the actual or real 
income attributable to business done or income derived 
from sources within its borders. 
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'l'heories of allocation have no place in determining 
ineome tax on a corporation if net income within a state 
ran be distinguished from outside business. Fisher v. 
Sfondard Oil (8 Cir.) 12 F. 2d 744. 
If the taxpayer's business within the state is separ-
able from his other business outside the state, no allo-
cation nuder the income tax statutes is necessary in order 
to dekrmine the amount of tax to be paid. 85 C.J.S., 
7'a1.J·atirm, § 1103; Mexican Petroleum Corp. of Georgia v. 
Head, 64 Ga. App. 529, 13 S.E. 2d 887; Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 121 P. 2d 1008, 190 
Okla.172; Texas Co. v. Cooper, 107 So. 2d 676, 236 La. 
380; McWilliams Dredging Co. v. McKeigney, 227 Miss. 
/::JO, 86 So. 2d 672, app. dism. 352 U.S. 807, 77 S. Ct. 57, 
1 L. Ed. 2d 38. 
Separate accounting on a completed job basis is a 
prerise record of income attributable to a state. 1 It is a 
complete rerord of sales, costs and expenses resulting 
from business done within the state. In the present case 
the taxpayer's business activities are clearly separable 
and suhject to separate accounting. The plaintiff kept 
its books and rerords of its Utah contract separate from 
those of its other business activities. It filed its Utah 
franchise tax returns on a segregated accounting basis. 
As the portion of plaintiff's income attributable 
to its Utah activities is clearly reflected in its records 
and tax returns, such income is taxable without reference 
1 A complete discussion of separate accounting as related to the allocation 
of business income is found in Allocation of Income in State Taxation, 
Altman & Keesling, pp. 89·97, 1946 C.C.H. 
17 
to the formula provided by Section 59-13-20(6), U.C.A 
1953. Only where income cannot be ascertained should 
the allocation formula be used. 
POINT II 
THE TAXPAYER DOES NOT CONDUCT A 
UNITARY BUSINESS. 
The taxpayer contends that it is a unitary business 
and therefore is not capable of specifically accounting 
for its income. This contention is in direct conflict 
with the 1962 agreement signed by the taxpayer. It also 
contradicts the returns and records of the taxpayer which 
are maintained and filed on a segregated basis. 
A business is unitary ''if business done in any state 
benefits the business done elsewhere and is benefited by 
the business done elsewhere because of the distribution 
of processes and operations, centralized management, in-
creased buying power, volume reduction of manufac-
turing cost, or other factors of the business as a unit. 
Altman & Keesling, Allocation of Income in State Ta:rar 
tion, p. 38. If the business is of such character, income 
apportionment by formula may be required except where 
the result is obviously unreasonable in a particular case. 
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701. 
The Utah Franchise Tax Statutes provide for the 
taxation of foreign corporations doing business in this 
state. The extent of Utah's power to tax is limited to 
income from sources within the state. Where income of 
a corporation is derived from sources partly within and 
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partly without a taxi11g state and ·where the business is 
nnitar)· in the sense that husi1wss transacted within the 
state is i10t separahle from that transacted outside the 
statP, taxation of the income of such a corporation is 
c·oHtrollPd hy the Commerre Clause of the Federal Con-
stitution. In this situation most state statutes provide 
for an alloration to the taxing state of a portion of the 
total inC'ome of suC'h a business. Surh statutes are con-
stitutional. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221, 
64 L. Eel. 445; Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 
40 R. Ct. 228, 54 L. Ed. 460. 
Such statutes generally provide methods or formu-
hie i'or <1llorati11g to the taxing state a share of the total 
inrome of a multi-state business where the business in 
the state is not separable. Often they permit the use of 
alternate methods if inequities result from a statutory 
formula. ]fatso11 Nar. Co. v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion, 297 U.S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 553, 80 L. Ed. 791. 
These alloration statutes are intended to prevent 
dot1lil<~ taxation resulting from the impoRition of state 
taxes upon inrome crossing state lines. But even where 
ineome of a lmsinC'ss is derived partly from within and 
partly from without a taxing state, formula allocation 
of inrome is not proper where the business transacted 
within the state is separable from that transacted with-
out. Fisher v. Standard Oil Co., (C.C.A. 8th) 12 F. 2d 
i44. 
It is well established that the unitary nature of a 
h11si1lC'ss is dependent upon the manner in which the 
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business is conducted. Crawford Manufacturing Co. 1, 
State Commission of Revenue and Taxation, 180 Kan. 
352, 304 P. 2d 504. In that case the court concluded that 
the question of the unitary nature of a business was a 
mixed question of law and fact properly within the jur-
isdiction of the fact-finding state commission. The court, 
however, cited Altman & Keesling, Allocation of Income 
in State Taxation, 1946, p. 100, as follo·ws: 
"The authorities, we believe, preponderate in 
holding that the direct or separate accounting 
method may not be properly employed to deter-
mine the amount of income earned in the particn-
lar state ·where it ·was derived from a unitars 
business. Instead, the factor formula should he 
employed, thus giving weight to the different far-
tors responsible for earning the income so as to 
apportion it from the entire business among the 
states in which it was earned." 
The taxpayer herein seeks to utilize a claim of uni-
tary business operations to avoid the separate reporting 
of its Utah business activities. The rule stated above does 
not apply, however. 
'' ... Where the business within the state is 
truly separate and distinct from the business with-
out the state, this segregation can be made fairly, 
easily and accurately, and, accordingly, the sepa-
rate accounting method may properly be use~. 
Where, however, the business within the state 1~ 
not a separate business but is an integral part of 
a unitary business carried on within and witho~t 
the state, difficulties will be encountered both in 
the segregation of the gross income attributable 
to the state and in the segregation of the expenses 
attributable to the state and in the segregation of 
the expenses attributable thereto .... Op. cit, p. 90. 
20 
Even a finding that a business is unitary, however, 
has been held not to preclude state taxation of various 
aspects of its intrastate activity. 
In the case of Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina 
' 
283 U.S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 879, the taxpayer 
was engaged in the business of tanning, manufacturing 
and selling leather products. The principal manufac-
( uring and supply house was located in North Carolina. 
Sales were made throughout the United States, and the 
question of a proper apportionment formula was at 
rnsue. The court said: 
"The difficulty of making an exact apportion-
ment is apparent, and hence, when the state has 
adopted a method not intrinsically arbitrary, it 
will be sustained until proof is offered of an un-
reasonable and arbitrary application in particu-
lar cases. But the fact that the corporate enter-
prise is a unitary one, in the sense that the ulti-
mate gain is derived from the entire business, does 
not mean that for the purpose of taxation the ac-
tivities which are conducted in different jurisdic-
tions are to be regarded as 'component parts of a 
single unit' so that the entire net income may be 
taxed in one state regardless of the extent to 
which it may be derived from the conduct of the 
enterprise in another state." 283 U.S. p.133. 
A recent Louisiana case involved a claimed unitary 
business under a fact situation not wholly dissimilar to 
the instant matter. In Texas Co. v. Cooper, 236 La. 380, 
107 So. 2d 676, the Texas Company, conducting opera-
tions on a world-·wide scale, produced crude oil in Louisi-
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ana. Its oil refineries and asphalt plants were operated 
outside that state, but a significant portion of its crude 
oil production was in Louisiana. The State Collector 
of Revenue required the taxpayer to report his income 
by a separate accounting method, which was contested by 
the taxpayer, who argued that the statutory apportion. 
ment formula method should be used. The taxpayer 
argued that the collector did not possess the statutory 
power to require its income to be determined by a sepa-
rate accounting method, and that if such attempts were 
made, the federal constitution was offended. Louisiana 
statutes defined the manner in which the net income 
eanied by a foreign corporation from sources within the 
state was to be determined and prescribed two methods 
of determining the amount of income tax to be paid to 
the state. They were a separate accounting method and 
an apportionment method. The statute provided: 
"Where the collector finds that the use of the 
apportionment method by the taxpayer produces 
a manifestly unfair result and that the separate 
accounting method would more equitably deter-
mine the amount of net income derived from 
sources in Louisiana, he may require that the 
separate accounting method be used in such case." 
L. S. A. - R. S. 42 :244. 
The Texas Company produced about 30,000,000 bar-
rels of crude oil in Louisiana, which was co-mingled with 
company-produced oil and sold either to purchasers in 
Louisiana or transported out of the state to company 
refineries. The company filed its 1950 income tax returns 
and paid its tax for that year by the apportionment 
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method, which resulted in a tax of $58,336.35. The col-
lector calculated a tax deficiency in the amount of $468,-
398.49, which in large measure was based on his separate 
accounting theory. The taxpayer argued that it was 
impossible and inequitable to attribute any direct profit 
to its Louisiana production operations, since, due to the 
unitary nature of its world-wide operations, each stage 
of the product's progress from production through re-
fining to distribution to ultimate marketing was so in-
terdependent that only the final gain or loss could be con-
sidered realized without identification of a particular 
process as the source of any part of eventual profit or 
loss. The court, adopting the trial court's decision, 
stated: 
''In the first place, counsel for plaintiff has not 
favored the court with any judicial decree holding 
that corporations engaged in the petroleum in-
dustry are unitary in character. To the contrary 
... the collector cites the following cases which 
in each instance upheld the taxpayer's (oil com-
pany) contention to the effect that company opera-
tions similar to those of the present taxpayer 
yere not so unitary in nature that the company 
was precluded from using the separate account-
ing method to determine intrastate profits as 
against the taxing authority's attempts to utilize 
he apportionment method of fixing the taxpayer's 
share of income attributable to the taxing states 
respectively: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Oklaho-
ma Tax Commission, 1941, 190 Okla. 172, 121 P. 
2d 1008; Standard Oil Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Com-
mission, 1929, 197 Wis. 632, 23 N.W. 85; Standard 
Oil Co., Indiana v. Thoresen, Tax Commissioner, 
etc., 8th Cir., 1928, 29 F. 2d 708; Fisher v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 8th Cir., 1926, 12 F. 2d 744, Ibid, p. 
681 and footnote therein.'' 
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The court continued: 
" ... Louisiana, having the right to collect a 
tax imposed on 11et income, has the right to deter-
mine what that right is in relation to the business 
transacted ·within the state if that can be clone 
fairly aml equitably even though the net income 
by that separate accounting method is more than 
what would be the state's aliquot portion of the 
earnings based on the statutorv formula of ap-
portionment of the nation wide ~perations." 
'' * * 
"The fact that the plaintiff can make a unit 
accounting of every step of its operations from the 
moment the crude oil comes to the surface until 
the sale of the refined product in all parts of the 
world convinces me that if there is a profit in the 
oil above the cost of production or purchase in 
Louisiana the margin of profit can he determiner] 
by an expert accountant as of the moment the oil 
leaves the state. An example of a unitary bu8i-
ness where it would seem to be impossible to make 
a separate accounting of income -within the boun-
daries of a state would be an express company, a 
telephone or telegraph company, in which the 
whole operation 'constitutes but a single plan, 
made so by the very character and necessities of 
the business.' '' 
"Plaintiff contends that it is not possible from 
an accounting standpoint to determine the net in-
come from its transactions in Louisiana by the 
separate accounting method. Not only does plain-
tiff actually use that method in those states whe~·e 
it wants to use it, but it appears to me that in 
Louisiana in order to find the arithmetical ratios 
which constitute the statutory formula used in the 
apportionment method, it is absolutely necessary 
to keep an account of and show the separate values 
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and amounts of the property, payrolls and sales 
of this plaintiff's business transacted in Louisiana 
which are fundamental steps and basic informa~ 
tion for a separate accounting. It is inconsistent 
to say that a separate accounting cannot be made 
when the apportionment formula cannot be known 
without a separation of the principal items of the 
Louisiana transaction used in determining net 
income." 
The court then cited Altman & Keesling, Allocation 
of lnco1ne in 8tate Taxation (2d ed. 1950), as follows: 
''Thus, in this field, as in many other fields, the 
ideal cannot be obtained. Something less than per-
fection must suffice.'' 
The court continued: 
"I see no reason why the separate accounting 
method applied to the oil gathering operation 
should not be as accurate as plain bookkeeping 
can and should be. While there is no testimony on 
the subject I can perceive more difficulty or inac-
curacy when the separate method is applied to 
sales of the refined products brought into the 
state .... " 
Altman & Keesling's book, Allocation of Income in 
State Taxation ( 2d ed. 1950), was cited as follows: 
"\Vhere the bnsiness within a state is truly 
separate and distinct from the business without 
the state this segregation can be made fairly, 
(>asily and accurately, and, accordingly, the sepa-
rate accounting method may properly be used." 
The court continued: 
"vVhere the business within the state is not 
separate, but is an integral part of a unitary busi-
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ness carried on within and without the state, diffi-
culties will be encountered in cleterminino· the . ~ 
rncome and expenses attributable to the state, anrl 
the principal objection to the apportionment meth-
orl is that it is apt to be arbitrary and to represent 
merely the opinion of the taxpayer, which may he 
biased_ Therefore, if the Texas Company hu~i­
ness is a unit from beginning to end and the 
Louisiana transactions cannot be separated to 
determine the net income from them, then that is 
all there is to this case and judgment \Yould haYe 
to be for plaintiff as prayed for. The CYidcnce in 
this case convinces me that a separate accounti11g 
of the Louisiana operations can properly he ap-
plied to determine the Louisiana net income. It 
is done by this plaintiff in other states where its 
operations are exactly the same as here and the 
collector has demonstrated that it can and should 
he done in Louisiana.'' 
The court made reference to a requirement imposing 
upon the collector the burden of showing that the appor-
tionment method produced ''a manifestly unfair result." 
The court said : 
"The term 'manifestly unfair result' has an 
obvious meaning in the context of its statuton· 
setting ... [This] demonstrates to us the legis-
lative intent that the 'manifestly unfair result' 
ref erred to is a manifestly inaccurate representa-
tion through the apportionment method of in-
come derived from within Louisiana, so that the 
separate accounting method more equitably deter-
mines the amount of the net income attributable 
to Louisiana operations. 
' ' This standard is applicable both to the tax-
payer and to the collector.'' 
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The court concluded: 
''The apportionment method produces a mani-
festly unfair rsult, and the separate accounting 
method more equitably determines the income 
derived from Louisiana sources, not because the 
tax liability is greater by the latter method, but 
because the separate accounting method assigns 
a value properly attributable to the Louisiana 
production operations of the taxpayer by includ~ 
ing within the measure of the tax the value of the 
oil produced by such production operations, 
whereas the apportionment formula in computing 
state tax liability does not take into account the 
value of such operations insofar as singularly at-
tributable to this state wherein are produced ap-
proximately 30,000,000 of the 100,000,000 barrels 
of oil ·which constitute the world-wide production 
of the taxpayer. 
''A domestic producer identically situated with 
the appellant which sold its product at the mar-
ket value would report a net income based upon 
the gross price or value of the oil produced, less 
the expenses of production. The separate ac-
counting method requires the taxpayer to deter-
mine its net profit from Louisiana production op-
erations on the same basis. Ibid. p. 690." 
The 1956 case of 1lfcWilliams Dredging Co. v. Mc-
Keigny, 227 Miss. 730, 86 So. 2d 672, app. dism. 352 U.S. 
807, 77 S. Ct. 57, 1 L. Ed. 38, is directly controlling. There, 
the taxpayer, an Illinois corporation, was engaged in the 
performance of dredging contracts. Certain projects 
were performed entirely within the State of Mississippi. 
ln addition it conducted crossing repairs between Mis-
sissippi and Louisiana and had other projects in Illinois, 
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Louisiana and Texas. It reported income from these 
projects to Mississippi under an apportionment formula. 
The Mississippi Tax Commission set up schedules basino 
b 
a proposed tax assessment upon receipts from the dredg-
ing contracts in Mississippi less certain prorated co11 _ 
tract costs. The Commission justified its methou of 
assessment in the following words: ''It is believed we 
can prove that you, of necessity, must determine the 
probable cost of any contract performed at any time 
in order to bid. Having done so, it would be the height 
of folly not to maintain an accounting system which 
would tell you whether or not yon had erred in arriving 
at your bid ... " 
The taxpayer contended that its business was a m1i-
tary operation in that its component parts ·were so close!)· 
connected and necessary to each other that the business 
could not be divided into separate units for state income 
tax purposes and that therefore the Commission's assess-
ment was improper. 
The court after citing the applicable statute and 
regulations said : 
''Our law unquestionably favors the specific 
accounting by foreign corporations .... It has 
been well said that 'theories of allocation have no 
place in determining income tax on c?r.f:lora'.ions, 
if net income within the state can be d1stmgmshed 
from outside business.' Magnolia Petroleum Co. 
v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 190 Okla. 172, 121 P. 2d 
1008, 1011.'' 
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The court continued: 
''In the case here the tax commission did not 
seek to have a formula upheld. It contended that 
specific accounting should and could be made. 
It rejected the company's formula. Consequently 
the burden was on the company to show that its 
extra-territorial values were being taxed or af-
fected. It cannot complain unless it can show that 
the Commission's method was arbitrary and un-
reasonable. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State 
Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82, 59 
L. Ed. 282. 
''As has been stated, the formula, upon which 
the Company based its returns, was applicable 
to manufacturing. But by no stretch of the imagi-
nation could dredging fall into the category of 
manufacturing. 
''The Company maintained that its operations 
were so unitary that it was impossible, from its 
books, to account specifically on its Mississippi 
contracts. Yet, by its books, it had no difficulty 
in so accounting to the State of Louisiana for its 
income in that state. 
"In bidding on a contract, it was of course 
necessary for the Company to anticipate and take 
into consideration all proper expenses and costs 
in advance in making its bid so that it could insure 
a profit. If this could be fairly done with reason-
able certainty, assuredly the Company could keep 
up with its receipts and expenses, and reasonably 
determine, and have reflected in its books, the 
profit or loss on each particular contract. The 
auditors of the Tax Commission experienced no 
insurmountable difficulty in ascertaining from the 
books of the Company its receipts from each proj-
ect together with expenses properly chargeable 
thereto. 
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"One serious trouble about the manner in 
which the Company kept its books was that, al-
though a substantial profit was shown on all the 
contracts wholly or partly performed in Missis-
sippi, yet, by insisting that it had the right to 
charge to the Mississippi projects an unreason-
able amount of the so-called ''idle shop account," 
it attempted to cancel out a large part of its l\Jis-
sissippi income. Since it had a number of other 
projects, the Company was not entitled to attrih-
ute to its Mississippi contracts an undue propor-
tion of this account. 
''The fact that such an over-all return on the 
Company's business, so far as federal income 
is concerned, might be proper or acceptable fur 
that purpose is no reason why it should be ap-
plicable insofar as state income is concerned. If 
the laws or conditions in this state were perhaps 
more conducive to the earnings of profits than 
elsewhere, nevertheless this should not haYc the 
effect of penalizing this State by taking the income 
earned here to replenish the Company's coffers 
which had been exhausted by loss from profligate 
or improvident contracts elsewhere.'' 
There is little or no justification in the record for the 
facts asserted for the first time by plaintiff on pages 21 
to 23 of its brief. As such they are not properly before 
the court and must be disregarded in the determination 
of this matter. Brandley Y. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 P. 
2d 338. 
In this regard Section 59-13-46, U.C.A. 1953, provides 
in part: 
"Upon the hearing [in the Supreme Court] no 
new or additional evidence may be introduced, 
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but the cause shall be heard upon the record be-
fore the tax commission as certified by it ... " 
Under a statute very similar to 59-13-46, U.C.A. 
1953, this court was faced with an attempt to supplement 
the factual record in the case of Ferguson v. Industrial 
Commission, 63 Utah 112, 221 Pac. 1099. It was there 
stated: 
''This court has frequently held that in cer-
torari proceedings the record certified up by the 
tribunal to whom the writ is directed imports ab-
solute verity, and cannot be contradicted or sup-
ported by extrinsic evidence." 63 Utah 112, 114. 
However, even if such facts ·were present and un-
contested, the cases of McWilliams Dredging Co. v. Mc-
Ke·igney, 227 l\Iiss. 730, 86 So. 2d 672, and Texas Co. v. 
Cooper, 236 La. 380, 107 So. 2d 676, would appear to 
to control. 
Plaintiff has cited no cases holding that corpora-
tions engaged in the construction business in several 
states are unitary in nature. The McvViUiams Dredging 
Co. case, supra, holds they are not. The only justifica-
tion for adopting the plaintiff's claim that it is a unitary 
business entitled to use the apportionment formula is 
if actual net income resulting to plaintiff from its Utah 
operations cannot be determined. 
That plaintiff incurs overhead expense in the over-
all administration of its business does not convert it into 
a unitary business. The tax commission has allowed a 
deduction for a portion of such expense. 
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The fact remains that the plaintiff actually segrP-
ga tes and separately accounts for its Utah income. It i~ 
absolutely necessary to the well-being of plaintiff's busi-
ness that the separate values and amounts of property, 
payrolls, sales and income in Utah be kept. 
Not only does the plaintiff actually segregate arnl 
separately account for its Utah income, but the Utah 
apportionment formula requires a similar segregatio11 
and separation. The formula should not obscure thl· 
underlying purpose of the Utah Franchise Tax Act, i.e., 
to equate the value of the franchise to the net income 
derived from Utah business operations. 
POINT III 
THE TAXPAYER IS ENTITLED TO DEDUCT 
NO :l\fORE THAN THE PORTION OF FED-
ERAL TAXES PAID -WHICH PERTAINS TO 
INCOME FROM ITS UTAH OPERATION~ 
AGAINST ITS UTAH I~COME FOR FRA;;1-
CHISE TAX PURPOSES. 
The taxpa;"er claims that should the Court fincl the 
statutory formula inapplicable to its operations so as to 
require the reporting of gross income from Utah alone, 
then it should be entitled to a deduction of projected fed-
eral taxes ·which it would ]m\"e paid had it only reported 
the Utah income. 
It seems perfectl_\" clear that the plaintiff can claim 
no more deductions than those aetuall;" 1wid. Deduction~ 
are exemptions from taxation ancl ·where taxation is the 
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rule exemption is the exception. Any statutes purporting 
to establish exemptions from taxation must be strictly 
construed against the taxpayer. 
The statutes in question provide as follows: 
59-13-3. "Every . . .corpora ti on, . . . for the 
privilege of exercising its corporate franchise or 
the privilege of doing business in the state, shall 
annually pay to the state a tax equal to four per 
cent of its net income for the preceding taxable 
year computed and allocated to this state in the 
manner hereinafter provided, ... '' 
59-13-5 (1). " 'Gross income' includes gains, 
profits and income derived from services, of what-
ever kind in whatever form paid, or from trades, 
lmsinesses, commerce or sales, or dealings in 
property, whether real or personal, growing out 
of the O'Nnership or use of or interest in such 
property; also from interest, rent, dividends or 
securities or the transaction of any business car-
ried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and 
income derived from any source whatever." 
59-13-7. "In computing net income there shall 
be allowed as deductions: 
'' * * * 
''Taxes Paid. 
"(3) Taxes paid or accrued ·within the taxable 
year, ... " (emphasis supplied.) 
Thus it appears that to accept the taxpayer's posi-
tion im-olves granting a greater deduction than that 
allowed by the statute. 
The tax commission, on the other hand, takes the po-
sition that the statutory deduction must be apportioned, 
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m case of multi-state taxpayers, in accordance with th0 
relationship of income -within the State of Utah as c:om-
pared to income outside the state. The question arises, 
therefore, as to what deduction exactly the statute doc, 
allow. 
The comm1ss1on has promulgated a regulation, No. 
13, which was in effect during the period in co11troverRy, 
which proYides in part: 
"Allocation of Federal Iucome Taxes. 
"(a) An assignment of a portion of the total al-
lowable federal income tax deduction on the 
Utah corporation franchise return may lie 
required for certain purposes, such as arriY-
ing at: 
"(b) 
( 1) Income less 'related expense' which i-
subject to specific allocation under the 
statute, 
(2) Net income from various propertie8 i11 
depletion computations, and 
(3) Separate accounting determinations of 
net income when authorized by the Utah 
State Tax Commission under the pro-
visions of sub-section ( 8) of sectio11 
59-13-20 of the statute. 
In general, the assignment of federal ill-
come taxes shall he made only to those seg· 
ments of net income subject to federal 
income tax and slrnll he made on the basis of 
net income before federal taxes. Due coll-
sidera tion must be giYen to segments of net 
income subject to special federal tax tr~at­
ment, such as domestic and foreign c11n-
dends, capital gains, etc. 
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'' ( c) Federal income tax assignments are to be 
made to profit-producing items or divisions 
only. Each profit-producing item or divi-
sion must be assigned its proportionate 
share of the total allowable federal tax 
deduction based on the ratio that the in-
come of such profit-producing item or divi-
sion bears to the total of all profit-produc-
ing items or divisions. Regardless of the 
mechanics used, the total of the federal 
tax assignments made against the profit-
producing items or divisions, regardless of 
where located or whether or not subject to 
state income or franchise taxes, may not ex-
ceed the total corporate federal tax liabil-
ity for the particular year involved, (in 
case of an accrual basis taxpayer), or the 
total amount paid (in the case of a cash 
basis taxpayer). 
The Utah State Tax Commission does 
not recognize for Utah corporation fran-
chise tax purposes the so-called 'tax-sav-
ings' resulting from loss items. 'Red-figure' 
allocations of federal income taxes will not 
be accepted. Loss items or divisions must 
not be assigned any federal income tax 
either positive or negative. Loss items or 
divisions shall be appropriately treated in 
effective tax rate determinations so as to 
produce assignments of federal income tax 
which are consonant with the requirements 
set forth herein.'' 
35 
Generally, it has been assumed that an allocalJ/e2 
portion of the federal taxes of a multi-state corporation 
should be deducted from gross income in order to arrin 
at usable "net income" under Utah law. See New Pad 
Mining Co. v. State Tax Commission, 113 Utah 410, 1% 
P. 2d 485; Kennecott Copper Co. v. State Tax Com 111 ., 
118 Utah 140, 221 P. 2d 857. 
To adopt the view advocated by the petitioner u1 
even to allow the entire amount of federal taxes paicl ln 
a multi-state taxpayer as a deduction against Utah nrt 
income is to overturn the pattern of tax compliance es-
tablished by the New Park Mining and Kennecott cases 
and to promote new controversy and litigation. This 
should not be done unless the tax commission's positio11 
is untenable. 
Research has disclosed fe,\· cases where this mat-
ter has arisen in other jurisdictions under similar statu-
tory provisions. 
Under a Kansas statute similar to our own a multi-
state corporation was held entitled to deduct from income 
allocable to that state an applicable portion of taxes pairl 
to the United States. The State Tax Commission had 
ruled that the taxpayer was entitled to no deduction. 
Apparently, no claim was made that the taxpayer was 
2 Only an allocated portion of federal taxes was involved in the Kenneco~I 
Copper case. See p. 10 of the defendant's brief, which indicates that fr· 
era! taxes of Kennecott were allocated to Utah, and p. 6 of defendants 
reply brief to plaintiff's petition for rehearing, wh!ch quotes Commm~i° 
instructions then in force limiting federal tax dedumons to those apphca ' 
property in Utah. 
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entitled to the entire deduction. Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 145 Kan. 715, 68 P. 2d 1. 
The deductions allowed to a business which extends 
into several states may be confined by statutes to those 
expenses, losses, etc., which are related to income de-
rived fom sources within the taxing state, where only 
such income is subject to tax. 
In the case of Buick Motor Co. v. Milwaukee, 48 F. 
2d 801, affirming 43 F. 2d 385, cert. den., 284 U.S. 655, 
52 S. Ct. 34, 76 L. Ed. 556, the taxpayer corporation sold 
automobiles and parts manufactured by the General 
Motors Company and was owned by the latter company. 
The court held the corporation subject to a Wisconsin 
income tax on the income from sales made through its 
Wisconsin branch and further approved the practice of 
the Wisconsin Tax Commission regarding the appor-
tionment of the deduction on account of federal income 
tax. In this case the General Motors Company and its 
subsidiaries made a consolidated federal return, but the 
Wisconsin Tax Commission allovved a deduction from 
the Wisconsin tax of the proportion of the consolidated 
federal tax as was attributable to Wisconsin business. 
The company contended that it should be allowed to 
deduct the same amount on account of federal income 
tax as an independent dealer would have been entitled 
to deduct, but this claim was rejected. 
The Kansas income tax of a corporation engaged in 
an interstate business was computed on the basis of an 
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allocation to that state of a portion of the corporation\ 
total income, in U11ion Pacific: Railroad Cn. v. State Ta.1 
Commission, 145 Kan. 715, 68 P. 2cl 1. 'There, the statutp 
provided for an allocation when~ a direct allocation wn, 
impractical. The court held that the mere fact that tlw 
corporation received interest on i1n-estecl funds whid1 
had no taxable situs in Kansas and so were excluded 
from the total income, a portion of which was allo-
cated to that state, clicl not make the interest paicl by it 
on mortgages on property in Kansas and elsewhere a 
related expense, but that an allocable pol'tion of the iu-
terest paid was deductible. 
The tax commission's position is best justified 11; 
the underlying purpose of the Franchise Tax Act. 111 
onler that allocation can reach its final aim of net i11co111 1 
to be assigned to the State of Utah it is first necessar;· 
to assign items of deduction to items of gross incomP 
arnl to allocate resulting net income or else to appor-
tion items of deduction separately. This is \Yhat the tax 
commission has done b)· separatel)· determining incomr 
and thereafter apportioning dednetion items. The result 
is true 11et income to Utah which our statutes manifestly 
intend to ta:s:. To allow all federal taxes paid l1y the pr-
tioner as a deduction is to not allocate or tax true ml 
income to the petitioner in this state. 
Deductions should be subject to the same geographi 
cal limitations as the gross income included. If 0111.1 
income derived from sources \Yithin this state is taxolilc. 
and this is the rule est a hlishcd hy ,:1 m ericau Inrrsf11u·id 
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Co. v. State Taa; Commission, 101Utah189, 120 P. 2d 331, 
337, then only items arising within the state should be 
allowed as deductions if true net income is to be ascer-
tained. See Altman & Keesling, Allocation of Income in 
State Taxation, p. 177. 
This argument is summarized by Atlman & Keesling 
in their book, Alloca.tion of Income in State Taxation, p. 
186, as follffws : 
" ... [T]he portion of federal income taxes 
which may be deducted is determined in most 
states on the basis of net income ... where net in-
come is used, the net income used is that of the 
year covered by the federal tax for which deduc-
tion is sought. The determination is made by ap-
plying to the entire amount of federal taxes on 
income a fraction, the numerator of which is the 
net income within the scope of th estate tax and 
the denominator of which is the net income shown 
by the federal returns.'' 
As Tax Commission Regulation No. 13 achieves sub-
stantially the same result and as the purpose of the Fran-
chise Tax Act is to tax net income attributable to Utah, 
it would appear proper to disallow any deduction which 
would tend to distort reportable true net income. No 
double taxation results from a refusal to allow a deduc-
tion greater than that actually attributable to Utah 
meome. 
POINT IV 
'I1HE QUESTION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE 
AGREEMENT TO FILE ON A COMPLETED 
CONTRACT BASIS USING SEGREGATED 
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ACCOUNTING IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
The question of the validity of the agreement (R. 
17-18) between the taxpayer and the tax commission 
was not raised before the tax commission in the pro-
ceeding below. 
It has long been the law of this state that legal 
questions cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
See Salt Lake Investment Co. v. Fox, 37 Utah 334, 108 
Pac. 1132; In Re Jones Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P. 2d 
210; Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P. 2d 465; Chief 
Consolidated Jf ining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 78 
Utah 447, 4 P. 2d 1083. 
Thus the question of whether or not this agreement 
is binding on the plaintiff has no bearing upon the issue> 
presented herein. 
Plaintiff's contention m this regard is based pri-
marily upon a claim that the tax commission has nn 
power to enter into written agreements with taxpayers. 
This question is also not before the court. 
It must be noted that authorities cited in plaintiff's 
brief on this point do not involve the present problem 
where a taxpayer seeks to rescind an agreement which 
has been relied upon by the state. 
It has been held that agreements between taxpayen 
and a state to pay taxes for which the taxpayer otherwise 
might not lrn-rn been liable are enforceable if supporte!l 
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hy sufficient consideration. Cornrnonu;ealth ex rel. Dept. 
of Justice v. Socony Vacuurn Oil Co., 347 Pa. 410, 32 
A. 2d 631. 
The contract in question involved the tax commis-
sion's release of a right to require filing and payment on 
a percentage of completion basis in exchange for the tax-
payer's promise to file and pay on a completed contract 
zasis. The practical benefits of this agreement to the 
taxpayer are apparent in that it is only required to sub-
ject its Utah income to taxation when ascertained and 
received. 
If the taxpayer desires to avoid the agreement, it 
would seem better to merely serve notice of the tax com-
mission that it wants to report on the percentage of com-
pletion or complete accrual basis. To change the basis 
of reporting income after returns are filed is to invite 
tax avoidance and create administrative hardship. It 
should not be allo-wed without compelling reasons 
therefor. 
POINT V 
THE ALLOCATION FORMULA PROVIDED 
BY SECTION 59-13-20, U.C.A. 1953, DOES NOT 
ALLOCATE INCOME FAIRLY AND EQUI-
TABLY IN THE CASE OF CONTRACTORS. 
The formula established in Section 59-13-20, U.C.A. 
195:3, allocates income to the State of Utah on the basis 
of a three factor formula. After certain specific treat-
ments for capital gains or losses, rents, interest, and 
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dividents, income attributable to the Utah activities of 
a multi-state corporation iR determined 011 the basis ol 
(1) tangible property, (2) salaries, wages aml commi.<. 
sions, arnl (3) sales. 
'11 he application of this formula contemplates a u11i 
tary business operation within and without the Rtate ol 
Utah, the operations of which are so inten1epem1ent and 
related that incom(' from the Utah portion alone cmrnnt 
be ascertained. The percentage resulting from thr 
formula i8 then representative of the amount of lmsine" 
done in any sta h>. 
However, because of the ·wide possibility of Yariancr 
of the formula factors, together with the unrelated irntmr 
of separate contract projects, the formula does not result 
in a reaRona ble or true detcrmina tiou of income in the 
case of contractors. 
In the tangible property fraction if all or most of 
the equipment is rented on one contract but owned h,r tlir 
corporation on another, in the formula for this pnrticn· 
lar fraction no income \Yould be assig-necl to the eontrae~ 
which had the rented equipment hut woulcl all be a'· 
signed to the contract wher0 the equipment \ms o,rned. 
regardless of the earnings of each contract. 
In the '"'age fraction, 011 one contract the labor may all 
be subcontracted and the corporation have little or no 
payroll for its O\Yn employc>c, and on another the per· 
sonnel may all be employees of the corporation. The in· 
come, of course, would then be weighted or allocated to 
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the contract which used company employees and not to 
!lie 011e which used subcontractors. 
Arni in the sales fraction, sales, under Section 
:i9-J :)-20 ( 6) ( c) are assigned to the office out of which 
the taxpayer negotiates such sales. In the case of a con-
tradiug corporation the sale or negotiation of a par-
ticular contract may or may not be accomplished in the 
,ame state as the actual performance of such contract. 
Iu plaintiff's case the sale or negotiation of the con-
tract with Kennecott was out of the office located in 
Sioux ( ~ity, lowa ancl therefore under the formula would 
Hot he assigned to Utah. 
From a hypothetical application of the above three 
examples of the formula factors it can be seen that a 
very profita hle contract (such as the one with Kenne-
cott) could result in little or no net income allocated to 
this state if the corporation owned no property or equip-
ment (rented), paid no pages or salaries ( subcontrac-
tors), a11d assigned no sales (location of office) to Utah. 
For these reasons the tax commission has estab-
lishc<l special regulations governing the allocation of in-
come to contractors. The plaintiff filed its returns on 
the basis of segregated accounting pursuant to its agree-
ment with the tax commission in tacit recognition of 
1lie inequities resulting, to state and taxpayer alike, from 
<1 f'trict application of the formula. 
The deficiency assessment against plaintiff is based 
almost entirely upon the allocation of federal income tax 
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to taxpayer's various profit items or income di,·ision,, 
in and out of Utah as required by Corporation Fran. 
chise Tax Regulation No. 13. 
This regulation requires federal income tax to he 
assigned against profit producing items or divisions on!) 
Section 59-13-7(3), U.C.A. 1953, allows as a deduction 
against gross income "taxes paid or accrued within tht· 
taxable year.'' 
However, the plaintiff in filing its franchise tax re 
turn assigned what was termed "federal income tax'' 
as an expense against its Utah income in the amount of 
52 per cent of its Utah net income before tax. In other 
words, it assigned $905,443.46 "federal income tax" to 
its Utah net income, while the actual accrued federal in-
come tax liability as computed in its federal return, after 
investment credit, was $183,213.11. 
Thus, while plaintiff only paid $183,215.11 actual fell· 
er al taxes, it claims the right to deduct federal faxes ii 
would o-we if it recei Yed $1,7 41,237.43 in income aml 
did business in Utah alone. 
The statute requires actual figures to be used in allo· 
eating direct income, direct expenses and indirect ex· 
penses. Actual figures should also be used in assignin~ 
federal taxes. Regulation 13 con templates an assigmnenl 
of the actual federal tax to each profit item only to thr 
extent it is subject to federal tax. As a result loss iteiw 
are not assigned any federal tax. 
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If f e<leral taxes are assigned against such loss items, 
extreme inequities result to the taxing authority. This 
can best he illustrated by the following two hypothetical 
examples ·which "\vould not be allowed by Regulation 13: 
Within Utah Outside Utah Total 
Net contract 
profit before 
fed. tax -------- $2,000,000.00 $ ( 1,000,000.00) $1,000,000.00 
Fed. tax@ 
52% (ex-
pense) __________ * 1,000,000.00 500,000.00) * 500,000.00 
Net taxable 
income __________ $1,000,000.00 $( 500,000.00) $ 500,000.00 
•(Actual federal tax only $500,000.00. Utah assigned $1,000,000.00 
fed tax.) 
If the plaintiff's position is carried to the extreme, 
the following could o~ur: 
Within Utah Outside Utah Total 
Net contract profit 
before fed. tax ______ $2,000,000.00 $ ( 2,000,000.00) -0-
Fed. tax @52% 
(approx.) ______________ 1,000,000.00 ( 1,000,000.00) "' -0-
~:__:__~~~~~~~-=---c~~---::~ 
Net taxable income .. $1,000,000.00 (1,000,000.00) -0-
========================== 
•Actual federal income tax -0-, yet Utah assigned $1,000,000.00 federal 
tax expense. 
In the foregoing example Utah would be allocated 
more than total net income, just as in fact plaintiff allo-
cated more net income to Utah on its 1962 return than its 
total for that year. 
It is apparent from these examples that Utah in-
come can be reduced by a nonexistent federal tax lia-
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bility if plaintiff prevails herein. Such a result clearh 
does not allocate to this state the proportion of net j
11 
come fairly and equitably attributable to the state an
11 
furnishes sufficient justification for the commission trJ 
disregard the formula and make an allocation of incom1 
under Section 59-13-20(8), U.C.A. Hl53. 
CONCLUSION 
The apportionment formula established by Sectio11 
59-13-20, U.C.A. 1953, produces manifestly unfair result, 
in this case. Plaintiff's income must be separately <le-
termined in order that it may be subjected to a proper 
tax liability. 
In any determination of this liability it is income 
resulting from busineses transacted ·within the state 
which is the measure of the value of plaintiff's franchise 
Deductions from this income are allovvable only to the 
extent authorized by law. 
For these reasons the tax commission urges that it' 
decision be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
F. BURrl'ON HOW ARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake Ci.ty, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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